My return + Reservists

Yes, I know, I know...I disappeared for a while. In May, I finally left the National Defense University, where I had worked since December 2012, to join the McCain Institute for International Leadership. I really have no excuse for going away, because since I last blogged, the world has been falling apart: Ukraine and Syria got hotter, Iraq and Gaza got hot again, and the South China Sea looks like it could be next (oh, and Azerbaijan and Armenia are probably going to go to war soon, too, if anyone cares.) Right now, nobody trusts the American government to do the right thing, so Obama is seeking to regain whatever foreign policy credibility he lost with the Syrian "red lines" by raining PGMs down upon the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The irony is that the administration is actually responding to domestic pressures whose existence is dubious, if Pew surveys are any indication: I get the impression that Americans at this point hate Obama's image (like eating burgers while MH17 was shot down) more than they hate his policies. Meanwhile, Fareed Zakaria is trying to be the sole voice of hope during a bleak time, but I'm not reassured: I think it's safe to say that 2014 has been a terrible year for world peace. So maybe the currently-fashionable comparisons with 1914 are not really appropriate, but it's hard not to get a little bit downtrodden when one watches CNN or checks their Twitter feed. I think that's part of the reason I didn't want to blog about foreign policy or defense: Too damn depressing.

With so many wars and so little time, it's been hard for me to follow any very closely, but I have continued to pay attention to the situation in Ukraine, even before MH17 was shot down, because I remain curious to see how much the Russian military has improved itself since 2008, which was the subject of a major recurring research project that I worked on at NDU. Now that the Russians are possibly preparing for a ground incursion into Ukraine (admittedly, they didn't go in when they had the chance back in April), it's time to start thinking about all of the ways that it could go wrong, or right. The answer to that question depends upon how far along "New Look" has come, so now is the time to test the thesis of Bettina Renz' recent IISS report, which is that "Russia is much closer to having the military it needs than has often been suggested." I'll spend some time on that issue this weekend, because I know too much about this topic not to write anything.

I have also continued to think about how the U.S. armed forces can retain the best mix of capabilities and force structure in light of the drawdown and the fact that DoD's current budget plan will exceed Budget Control Act spending caps by $88 billion unless major changes are made. One interesting idea being heard from people like LTG David Barno (ret.): Why not use the Reserves and National Guard to fill capability gaps? In particular, why not divert those officers and NCOs who are facing separation by next year to join reserve components? Don't we want to keep their skill sets and combat experience at a reduced cost, without slashing them from the force completely? My thoughts:

• Reservists are, undeniably, a lot cheaper than active-duty personnel: They cost $125K per capita vs. $385K per capita (respectively) and account for 16% of personnel costs even though they represent 39% of the total force. I think for many people thinking about this issue, that's reason enough: We have to take the force mix that is most affordable, simply because that's the decisive factor right now.
• Readiness is often the first casualty of more reservist-oriented force structure (just ask the Russians), since nobody serving in a reserve capacity can ever be as well-trained and competent at their job as someone in the active-duty force. But considering how expensive active-duty personnel have become in the past decade, and how much less money is available to spend on them, the readiness argument is probably moot: As (now former) Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness Clifford Stanley testified back in 2010, more money spent on "taking care of people" means less money for training and repairing/replacing equipment. (I've written previously about how personnel costs undermine readiness and why the Brigade Combat Team-centric force structure might not make so much sense for a peacetime force).
• Barno's proposal calls for a mixing of active and reserve forces ("blended" units) at the brigade level, even as he acknowledges that it's not obvious that that their capabilities are interchangeable. If that's going to happen, the active and reserve components need to be on better terms with each other than they are now: This means, no more fighting over who gets the Apaches and no more denigrating each other's value to the war efforts. (And the CSA needs to be able to set aside his own biases towards the active force.)
• Overlooked by proponents of the Reserve-based force structure (including the RFPB): Reservists tend to have higher suicide rates than active-duty personnel. PTSD also affects reservists at such a disproportionate rate that RAND did a study on them. This evidence suggests that not being full-time soldiers/airmen/sailors/Marines means that they are less psychologically adapted to handle the pressures of combat deployments.
• During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many veterans found that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) didn't really help them in the civilian world: Employers have remained hesitant to hire reservists, and high unemployment of reservists (20%) persists, even though the Congressional Budget Office found in 2005 that employers were not substantially affected by reservists' deployments. Creating a larger force of underemployed reservists should not be acceptable in our sequestration-era defense planning, so USERRA will need to be updated (see this proposal, for example).

In the long run, I think the question is not if but when we face facts and start leaning more on the reserve components. But if we are going to improve the standing of reservists in the future force structure, we will first need more (or at least the same number) of reservists. The recently-released report of the National Defense Panel laments that the reserves will fall from 563,000 in 2012 to 500,000 by 2019: "The reduction in the reserve component is especially troubling in light of the increasing role we believe it will assume in future homeland defense and domestic disaster response." Kicking experienced veterans out of the active-duty force and reducing the reserve components simultaneously, intuitively, sounds like a very bad idea. But as illustrated above, keeping/increasing reservists poses challenges of its own, so more reforms will be needed before LTG Barno's idea will become a viable plan for the force.

As if the U.S. didn't have enough to be concerned about in Crimea...

...this story provides yet another case study for the cyberwar (or "cybered warfare", if you prefer) debates. Note also the observation that, "America’s military and intelligence communities are grappling with these issues at all levels, but it’s particularly important for the Army given the large size and expansive reach of Army networks, which are the largest among all the service and which extend down to the tactical edge. The Army is responding to these developments in numerous ways.
The Army is considering the formation of a new branch or corps of cyberspace operators that spans electronic warfare, cyber and signals, a recommendation made by RAND and others. Several years ago, the Navy moved to create an information dominance corps, which merges electronic warfare and information technology functions into new career fields. The Army should follow suit."

On that note, the report from RAND quoted in the article is also a good read.

This is neat!

I discovered yet another new blog on the Russian military and foreign policy. Today, Wikistrat published an analysis titled, "What Would a Russian Invasion of Ukraine Look Like?" I was not familiar with Mark Galeotti until now, but he's apparently done good work on the topic (including an earlier piece for Foreign Policy), so I am going to have to read further.

RIP James Schlesinger + more on Ukraine situation

I wanted to open this post by paying my respects to James Schlesinger, who died today at the age of 85. I'll admit I knew little about him until now, besides the fact that he pissed off almost everyone at the CIA by cutting their manpower 10%, but he was also a major proponent of two of the best modern combat aircraft ever flown by the U.S.A.F.: The A-10 Warthog and the F-16 Fighting Falcon. (He was apparently ill for a while before his death, but I wonder what he thought about the Pentagon's recent steps towards retiring the A-10.)

Now it's time for me to eat some crow of my own: I've previously expressed skepticism that a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine would happen. And it looks like I was wrong (apologies to my roommate). The Russians are claiming that the 30,000 troops now on the border are just an exercise, and the Pentagon has called bullshit on them. The UN has officially declared the referendum leading to Crimea's annexation as illegal, which is always re-assuring just because - well, it's the UN, and non-binding resolutions are always welcome at times like these. Meanwhile, Obama called out Putin yesterday, and then, surprisingly, shot back at Russian accusations of U.S. hypocrisy by defending the Iraq War: "[E]ven in Iraq, America sought to work within the international system. We did not claim or annex Iraq’s territory, nor did we grab its resources for our own gain. Instead, we ended our war and left Iraq to its people, and a fully sovereign Iraqi state could make decisions about its own future." And now Russia Today has yet another rebuttal, calling Obama out for claiming that Kosovo's sovereignty, determined by referendum, was any more legitimate than Crimea's referendum. So that's that: Obama is flailing his arms angrily, Putin is sneering, China is sitting on the sidelines and watching, and meanwhile, Russia's troops are getting ready to take more territory away from Ukraine.

More worrying is that the discussion is now shifting towards other parts of the former Soviet Union that Putin might seek to bring back under Russian control. Gen. Breedlove, NATO's commander, has already pointed out that Transnistria in Moldova is a likely candidate for annexation. (The BBC has also put out a useful map of countries with Russian minorities to get one's imagination worked up over the possibilities, and it looks like the Washington Post is already following suit.)

Oh, and I love my boss' take on Obama's reaction: "U.S. says Russia is invading countries out of weakness. Europeans quietly hope it does not get any weaker."

So Crimea is once again Russian territory. Now what?

I'm still reeling in shock from a recent event that has truly rocked the world. It was something nobody could have seen coming, and it was the sort of thing most experts would have deemed impossible. I am talking, of course, about the stunning NCAA basketball upset that just took place on Friday, when Mercers' Bears managed to kick my Duke Blue Devils out of the tournament after beating them 78-71. Bear in mind that we were seeded 3rd, and the Bears were seeded 14th! This is the worst defeat we've suffered since Lehigh beat us in 2012, and as a Dukie, it's a loss that will take me some time to get over.

Oh, yeah, and the loss of Crimea to Russia is pretty bad, too (more for the United States, not so much for Duke). So, moving on...

The crisis in Crimea is finally settling, aside from continued rumors - mostly being promoted by the new Ukrainian government - of the Russians gearing up to move into southeastern Ukraine. At this point, nobody has any doubts that Crimea will return permanently to Russian control, exactly 60 years after Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine as a "gift". (Actually, Khrushchev mostly gave away Crimea for reasons of political expediency - such as winning the support of Kiev's elites to assist in his power struggle against then-Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov - but I am digressing.) Ukraine is pretty unhappy about the whole deal - the interim President, Oleksandr Turchynov, is ranting about how Ukraine "will never accept the annexing of our territory" in the vain hope that his nationalist cred won't be undermined too much by the Svoboda Party. In Russia, Putin and his buddies are laughing at the sanctions that Obama's administration announced last week. (I cast my vote for Deputy PM Rogozin's reaction as the most caustic so far.) And in the United States, pretty much everybody has given their take on what just happened, what it means for us, and who foresaw these events (and who dropped the ball in predicting them). I've decided to collect a sample of those reactions here, for future reference and my own reaction:

• The loudest crowing is coming from Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin and their supporters, who are all too happy to point out that they were right and Obama was wrong about Russia's significance as a rival. (Romney himself has also written an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal on what he calls Obama's "failed leadership.") And they do have a point - Obama, a man known for arrogance, is going to have to eat crow, especially after the 2012 Presidential debates. But I'm also not sure if I agree with the conclusion that "Conservatives have a history of correctly predicting world events."
• I haven't been at all surprised to hear people reference the classic cautionary tale of consequences for unchecked aggression - Neville Chamberlain negotiating with Adolf Hitler to achieve "peace in our time", back in 1938. The only surprise here is that none other than Hilary Clinton is among the voices making this comparison, not just the usual people we expect to hear at times like this.
• Last week, The Atlantic had a really good article examining why a robust American response (and certainly an American military response) is fiscally and politically unfeasible. Choice quote: "in today’s dollars, according to one estimate, the Marshall Plan would total roughly $740 billion. That kind of money would certainly enable far-reaching economic reforms in Ukraine, and likely anchor the country in the West for years to come. But, of course, the suggestion is absurd. Today’s Senate can barely pass an aid package 740 times as small."
• On the conservative side, Henry Kissinger is still trying to play the voice of restraint. Although Kissinger lost a lot of credibility in realist conservative circles by supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, he's being a lot more sensible these days, observing in an op-ed for The Washington Post that the time has come to "avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington" and that "[a] wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction." 
• Earlier this month, David Brooks got quite a bit of attention for describing the administration's policy as "The Leaderless Doctrine" in a piece for The New York Times. He laments that, "Americans have lost faith in the high politics of global affairs. They have lost faith in the idea that American political and military institutions can do much to shape the world. American opinion is marked by an amazing sense of limitation — that there are severe restrictions on what political and military efforts can do" A more optimistic rebuttal comes from Peter Munson at War on the Rocks, who concurs with Kissinger that a more hands-off approach is just right for Ukraine: "Putin’s desperate, losing move will ultimately be overcome by the tides of history. Far more important is helping Ukrainian leaders—and other leaders in similar situations—to thread the needle, channeling the blind passion of the people to a reasonable end."
• There are a number of voices in defense quarters asking whether it was really such a wise idea for the U.S. military to spend a decade becoming a COIN-centric force now that Russia has returned to the forefront of America's geopolitical rivalries. Former Air Force General David Deptula is happy to point out that maybe SecDef Bob Gates committed a gaffe by halting F-22 production and then firing everyone in the military's top ranks who disagreed with his vision for the force. (And on another note, maybe this means no more sequestration, or at least less sequestration...or so they hope.)

Photos from Ukraine

Some of these pictures, as posted on Business Insider, are pretty eye-opening:

Uniformed men (rear), believed to be Russian servicemen, watch Ukrainian servicemen walk past a Ukrainian military base in the village of Perevalnoye, outside Simferopol, March 6, 2014.

Uniformed men, believed to be Russian servicemen, walk in formation near a Ukrainian military base in the village of Perevalnoye outside Simferopol, March 6, 2014.

A Ukrainian serviceman (rear L) gives a cigarette to a uniformed man (R), believed to be a Russian serviceman, at a Ukrainian military base in the village of Perevalnoye, outside Simferopol, March 6, 2014.

Members of a pro-Russian self defence unit stand in formation as they take an oath to the Crimea government in Simferopol March 8, 2014.

Ukrainian soldiers, left watch as a Russian soldier guards the gate of an infantry base in Perevalne, Ukraine, Tuesday, March 4, 2014.

A Russian soldier lies with his back to Ukrainian fighter jets as he watches Ukrainian serviceman at the Belbek airport in the Crimea region March 4, 2014.

Yet more oversights by Putin...

...this time expressed in a surprisingly thought-provoking piece by Slate. Some inconvenient facts Putin (presumably) considered:

• "That narrow strip of land tethering northern Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland, called the Perokop Isthmus, is the peninsula’s lifeline. What’s left out of most Western analyses of Putin’s brazen military intervention is the Crimea’s complete economic dependence on the mainland, which provides nearly all of its electricity and water and about 70 percent of its food."
• "Most of the Crimea is basically a desert, with less annual rainfall than Los Angeles. It is impossible to sustain its 2 million people—including agriculture and the substantial tourist industry—without Ukrainian water. Current supplies aren’t even enough."
• "After independence, Ukraine welcomed back the Crimean Tatars. Some 300,000 have returned from exile and their numbers are growing, with continued migration and birth rates higher than either Russians or Ukrainians. They strongly oppose any separatism, and they will not go peacefully into a Russian-controlled, authoritarian 'Yanukistan' along the lines of Transdnistria. Not only are they extremely well organized, they are Muslims with friends. Representatives from Russia’s Tatarstan region are already supporting them. Turkey, which controlled the Crimea for much longer than Russia ever did and has close ties with the Crimean Tatars, is watching. So are Chechen rebels."

The Waterloo analogy sucks, though: Please let's stop comparing these types of crises to major, Earth-shattering global events.

Oh, no, Ukraine is getting invaded...

...quite soon:

And this is the reaction:

On another note, someone I know on Facebook posted this:

I'm going to continue to monitor the amusing reactions and misuse of historical analogies ("Is it the Cold War again? Is it 1914 again?"), but right now, I'm a lot more interested in Russia's snap military drill that began along the Russian-Ukrainian border a few days ago. Ukraine's acting President, Oleksander Turchinov, has already announced that this a military intervention by Russia would mean war. Sadly, some of my favorite bloggers on the Russian military (i.e. Dimitry Gorenburg) have not yet written more about the topic, but I expect that this crisis is going to give analysts a much better idea of the modernizing Russian military's ability to conduct joint operations within its re-drawn (as of 2010) military districts. Whatever happens, that will be the most important comparison to come out of this crisis and Georgia in 2008. Back then, the Russian military demonstrated that it couldn't even grasp tactical basics such as establishing air superiority and cover for its advancing ground forces as they attempted to squeeze through one point of entry - the Roki Tunnel (which would have made them extremely vulnerable, had the Georgians not been equally incompetent). This time, they're facing the far larger and better-equipped Ukrainian military, which has less recent combat experience than the Georgian forces, but plenty of other advantages (among other things, a growing lack of dependence upon incompetent and poorly-motivated conscripts, something the Russians cannot say about their own forces). In the end, Putin and everyone else knows that there is not much that the U.S. can do to keep him from exercising power in the Former Soviet Union. But his army needs to have a better showing than it did in 2008 if he wants any future threats to have credibility.

Oh, yeah, and:

Thoughts on the importance of the NCOs in the U.S. military

Earlier this month, I psyched myself up to take my ASVAB and PFT - the two tests that I must pass (or, rather, ace) if I ever wish to become an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. I wasn't too concerned about the ASVAB, but I was terrified of not being able to score a perfect 100 on all three events that constitute the PFT (for my age group, that means I have to run two miles in under 13 minutes, do 77 pushups, and 82 situps). But when I finally got to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) at Fort Lee for testing, I was turned away because it turns out that another MEPS in Baltimore has my information on-file and it needed to be transferred. So...it looks like joining the Army Reserves is going to have to wait (again). Oh, well.

In the meantime, I've been preoccupied with other matters. In order to get myself thinking about how I will want to carry myself around non-commissioned officers (NCOs) should I ever join the Army, I decided that I needed to remind myself of why they will deserve my respect as a lowly O-1. When I did my interview for my (eventually rejected) Air Force application last February, one of the major questions that came up was how I felt about NCOs.

I remember that I stumbled through an answer along the lines of, "Well, I realize that that as an O-1, I'm going to be entering the Air Force with nothing but my degrees and my theoretical knowledge learned in Officer Training School. Whereas a typical E-7 is going to have over a decade of operational experience, likely in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other deployments. We have to be able to complement each other."

But my interviewer, an Air Force Reserve O-4 who I had requested for the interview, told me, "You're missing the bigger picture here: The fact that the U.S. military has a professional class of career non-commissioned officers is one of the key differences between the U.S. military and almost every other military in the world."

Point taken: I didn't grasp why NCOs matter so much in the U.S. military. So I promised myself that I will have a better answer when I interview before the Army officer recruiting board. To that end, I have sought out reading material on the topic, and it just so happens that in December 2013, the National Defense University published a brand-new tribute to NCOs and their naval equivalents, Petty Officers (POs). It's called The Non-commissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces, and it can be downloaded here. Aside from the foreward, written by J-7 Chief Martin Dempsey, the book's content is the product of a team of Sergeant Majors, Master Sergeants, and Chief Petty Officers serving at NCO/PO academies across the United States.The first chapter of the book is written in somewhat flowery language, but otherwise does a good job articulating what it is that makes NCOs/POs so important:

• "NCOs/POs are the specially trusted leaders who provide an indispensable and irreplaceable linkage between command guidance and mission execution."
• "NCOs/POs nurture individual and organizational well-being by genuinely caring for their subordinates and promoting morale and esprit de corps within their units."
• "By teaching, coaching, and mentoring the force, and by instilling a sense of unity, purpose, good order, and discipline—and demanding compliance with standards, tradition, culture, customs, and courtesies—they are looked upon as the organization’s pillars of strength and loyalty."
• "Because they are the leaders closest to the force, NCOs/POs have the greatest effect on accomplishing organizational goals and achieving mission success."
• "NCOs/POs are a commander’s treasure, a source of seasoned perspectives that transcends place in the organizational hierarchy, a place neatly balanced between mission and people. They provide the commander and officer corps with unique insights and actionable perspectives while also providing an enlisted voice in matters concerning operations, administration, readiness, and the well-being of the force."

For my purposes, Chapter 4 was of greatest interest, because this is where the book addresses the ways that NCOs/POs complement commissioned officers. They discuss the three Cs' of good NCOs - they must be "competent, credible, and capable", and describe the NCO's role to the CO as "[the] principal advisor, a source of competence and counsel, who enhances the officer’s ability to command effectively."

There's another reason to consider the importance of NCOs in the U.S. military: Many analysts who talk about other modernizing armed forces in comparison to ours tend to overlook the role NCOs play. Discussions of the Russian armed forces of Chinese People's Liberation Army tend to speak mostly to their attempts at acquiring new weapons and technology, or re-organizing their force structure for greater agility and faster deployment timetables. Often overlooked is the fact that the Russians hope that they can recruit 64,000 NCOs, and the PLA wants to attract 150,000 well-trained college graduates for enlistment, under the assumption that will be better-suited to operating the complex new weapons systems it wishes to purpose. Both countries seem to recognize that having an NCO corps is essential to transforming their formerly conscript-based mass mobilization armies into professional all-volunteer forces, and I think that's worth keeping in mind. Officers and junior enlisted men will always be easy to recruit for short-term service stints, but the NCOs will always be the most valuable commodity to the force.

My unpublished article on HTS

Last month, I wrote an article that was intended for a certain online publication (which shall remain nameless). It was turned down, sadly, so I've decided to post it here. It's not well-written, but doing the research allowed me to familiarize myself with the controversy surrounding the Human Terrain System (on a related note, check out this book review by an NDU colleague).

Here it is:

A Congressman Is Waging War Against the Army’s Human Terrain Teams

Since its launch in 2006, the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) has been the subject of considerable online controversy.

The program was created to further the goals of the U.S. military’s then-new population-centric counterinsurgency campaign plan as outlined in FM3-24. HTS sought to embed military personnel and civilian social scientists within military units—usually at the Brigade level—in order to provide vital sociocultural understanding within the area of operations. Without adequate sociocultural understanding of Afghanistan and Iraq, unit commanders were less likely to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign through the support of the local population. The teams of embedded advisors comprising the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) would collect information on local cultures, tribal structures, and economics that could be used to brief Brigade commanders and their staffs, or uploaded into databases. (In Iraq, one HTT determined that restoring marshes in southern Iraq—previously decimated under Saddam Hussein’s regime—was vital to restoring the local economy and reducing arms smuggling to insurgents.)

But HTS has faced attacks from a variety of critics, some of whom have gone so far as to compare the program to the F-35 and label it one of the most “insanely wasteful projects the Pentagon is spending your money on.” The American Anthropological Association (AAA) has long opposed HTS on the grounds that it violates the AAA Code of Ethics because “information provided by HTS anthropologists could be used to make decisions about identifying and selecting specific populations as targets of U.S. military operations”; the AAA recently re-affirmed this stance. U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile, a prominent critic of the military’s embrace of population-centric counterinsurgency, has claimed that the effectiveness of the HTTs was “dubious at best” (though his claims have their own critics). Blogger John Stanton has written about HTS since 2007 and leveled numerous criticisms against the program; for instance, that “Hamas’ IT Tops Human Terrain System IT in Internet Capability, Savvy”.

In recent months, during Congressional debates over allocations for the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, the program was again targeted by Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), who called upon Congress to shut down the entire program in a December 2013 letter to the House Armed Services Committee. Pointing out that the Army already halved funding in 2013, Rep. Hunter argues that “the overall cost and failures of HTS indicate that the program be considered for termination.”

In his letter, Rep. Hunter cited a litany of allegations that led the Army to conduct its own investigation of HTS in 2010: Sub-standard work, inflated time sheets, incompetent supervisors, racism, sexism, and—guaranteed to resonate in the current political climate—the employment of CGI Federal (of Healthcare.gov infamy) as the main federal contractor behind the program. (Hunter neglects to mention that most of the aforementioned problems originated when BAE Systems held the program contract.) Even more recently, Rep. Hunter has complained that the total cost of the program, $726 million since 2007, remains unjustifiable in the current fiscal climate. He also has also expressed skepticism that the problems with HTS have been adequately addressed.

At the moment, the Army continues to defend the program. In a letter to Rep. Hunter in March 2013, Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh called the expertise provided by the HTTs “critical to military planning and operations.” McHugh has re-itereated this stance  again in recent months, claiming that 95 percent of commanders and staff members in Afghanistan “assessed HTS information as actionable and useful for decision-making.” However, it is not yet clear that the controversy over HTS will ever go away completely, given the negative media coverage and Rep. Hunter’s campaign against the program.

However, an alternative perspective of HTS has emerged in the past year. At the National Defense University in Washington, DC, a team of researchers led by Dr. Christopher J. Lamb has conducted the most in-depth assessment to date about HTS in Afghanistan. Their conclusions were published in a book, Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare, and a July 2013 article for Joint Force Quarterly. Using data from over 100 interviews, the team’s findings and recommendations paint a more complete, though hardly uncritical, picture of what the HTS has accomplished and its future value to ground forces:

·         Human Terrain Teams had to overcome numerous organizational limitations to perform well, but were able to meet, and even exceed, the expectations of commanders who did not fully appreciate the optimal role the teams could play in an integrated counterinsurgency campaign.

·         In fact, the large majority of field commanders thought HTTs were effective. This finding also echoes previous studies by researchers at West Point, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.

·         Throughout its history, the U.S. military has regularly had to develop sociocultural expertise at great cost after the initiation of conflict, and often too late to ensure success.  Eliminating HTS now because it experienced growing pains would be repeating a mistake rather than learning from history.

·         The program will likely perform better under the management of the Army’s Special Operations Command rather than the Training and Doctrine Command, which is not properly suited to support HTS. Dr. Lamb also made this argument in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in July 2012.

At a time when the Pentagon is facing enormous pressure to cut wasteful spending, it is understandable that the axe has swung in the direction of controversial programs that have come under public scrutiny. However, research suggests that Congress’ decision on the future of HTS must consider a more nuanced perspective than that currently represented in the public debate.

First blog post in 2014: Fighter costs

I'm still not blogging as much as I was when I started out - and it's partially due to a family emergency over the holidays. So, quick update: I just read a new article in The Diplomat that caught my eye: "Why Do Fighter Aircraft Cost So Much?" Highlights:

• "in many cases, governments only pretend to care about the expense of their fighters. Money spent on cost overruns for F-35s doesn’t just disappear; it makes defense contractors wealthy and generates jobs across the country. Representatives from districts that produce expensive fighters have literally no incentive to hold costs in line. The same goes for more authoritarian systems in which different power brokers use military spending to favor specific communities and interest groups."
• "An under-mentioned point in defense procurement debates is that the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft is often less about national defense than national identity. Both civilian and military leaders tend to resent the idea that neighbors and rivals will own and operate more capable, advanced, and expensive aircraft. Moreover, states don’t simply buy advanced fighters 'off the shelf,' as advanced aircraft have historically required long term deals for training, maintenance, and spare parts. Buying a fighter means buying a political relationship."
• "the advent of 3D printing may well mean that customers will have the opportunity to carry out much needed maintenance and repairs without relying on the sellers as much as they have in the past.  The days in which the Soviet Union could use MiG-23 airframes as a loss leader for jet engines, or in which the United States could use long-term maintenance agreements as a club to encourage additional purchases, are coming to an end."

Also, I've been paying way less attention to cyberwar and cybersecurity lately, but Peter Singer was recently quoted in a new Popular Mechanics article on the topic where (among other points) he draws attention to the continued business cultural ignorance of cyberspace at the higher levels - a problem I would argue the business community still shares with the military community:

• "As far as the actual surveillance activities that Snowden disclosed, I personally don't think that senior political leaders would have authorized many of them if they had understood the full ramifications. The discussion would have been fundamentally different if people had been able to connect the dots...Seventy percent of business executives, whether they're in car companies or defense companies, have already made a cybersecurity decision for their firm in some way, shape, or form, despite the fact that no major MBA [Master of Business Administration] program teaches this as a regular course of business management."